馬指鹿茸為毛的當天 美國為台灣關係法召開聽證會 (請參考聽證會影音或中英文逐字稿)
秋液指立法院的向日葵為香蕉的那一天 美國表態支持台灣可以加入TPP (請參第一篇新聞)
多位民主黨籍眾議員，包括恩格爾（Eliot Engel）、貝拉（Ami Bera）和瓦爾加斯（
Ed Royce強調Taiwan是我們在兩岸貿易的盟友, 質疑美國政府有沒有把台灣納入TPP?
Ed Royce認為TPP另外俱有標定國家的味道, 所以強力建議台灣要在裡面,
Moy提到F-16改裝計劃, 但Ed Royce認為直接賣新的F-16是更好的方法
Eliot Engle強調談到台灣時總是要彎腰不要觸怒北京, 這實在讓他很不爽!
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen中國開始建立第二艘航母, 我們應該要重申我們和民主好朋友
台灣的聯盟, 並質疑國務院阻擋和台灣的關係, 只是為了不要惹中國生氣
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen認為並沒有履行過去台美關係法交代的使命 質疑Moy你覺得有嗎?
Renee 何宇理 編譯
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
眾議院外交事務委員會 (House Foreign Affairs Committee)
Ed Royce, California, Chairman (113th)
Chris Smith, New Jersey
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida, former Chairwoman (112th)
Steve Chabot, Ohio
Randy Weber, Texas
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Eliot Engel, New York, Ranking Member
Brad Sherman, California
Eni Faleomavaega, American Samoa (Democrat)
Alan Lowenthal, California democrat
Gerry Connolly, Virginia
開場白 Opening Statements
羅伊斯 (加州，主席; 共和黨 ) (Mr. Royce)
Hearing on the promise of TRA. It’s been 35 years, for that period of time, TRA has served as the legal framework governing the important relationship between U.S. and Republic of China, Taiwan. Since the act came into force in 1979, there have been few other pieces of foreign policy legislation as consequential as the TRA. Indeed, it is the steadfast support of the US Congress that has helped Taiwan to be the way it is today: a thriving modern society that strongly supports human rights, strongly supports rule of law, the free market. The purpose of today's hearing is to consider whether the Administration is doing enough to fulfill the promise of the TRA.
America’s support for Taiwan is now more important than ever. It is vital that we speak with one voice, when it comes to our support for Taiwan. Strengthening the relationship with Taiwan is one of the Committee’s top legislative priorities. In fact, I have led two bipartisan delegations to Taipei within the last 13 months.
Last year, our delegation trip included a visit to Taiwan’s WWII era submarines based near Kaohsiung. And in just last month, the committee delegation of eight members of Congress traveled to Tainan to see first hand, the fleet of fighter jets that serves as the backbone of the Taiwanese air force. The fact that the first batch of these jets entered into service in 1965 is a stark reminder that Taiwan needs continuous support in order to maintain deterrence across the Taiwan Strait.
On this front, I reluctantly submit that we are not doing enough to meet the spirit of the TRA. We need to do more here in the U.S. And just as necessary is the defense sales are to Taiwan, it is equally important that the US actively support Taiwan’s efforts to maintain and expand its diplomatic space. When it comes to matters of public safety or public health, the U.S. must do its utmost to ensure that Taiwan has a seat at the table. For this reason, I authored the legislation that was signed into law, to help Taiwan participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) last year.
Taiwan’s absence from ICAO prevents it from obtaining air safety information in real time. The recent disappearance of the Malaysian aircraft highlights the importance of cooperation in the aviation field. As a result of my legislation, Taiwan has finally been able to have a seat in ICAO for the first time since 1976. Taiwan‘s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement is an important opportunity that we must not overlook.
By working to include Taiwan in a high quality, multi-lateral trade agreement, the US will be helping to preserve Taiwan’s ability to do business internationally. The events unfolding in the Ukraine remind us of the strategic weakness of relying on one major trading partner. I understand that the government of Taiwan will soon announce its intention to seek membership in TPP. As the Chairman of the committee, I strongly urge the Administration to support Taiwan’s inclusion in TPP. America’s consumers and exporters would benefit.
The story of Taiwan is really a story about transformation. From the grinding poverty of the post war era, to a military dictatorship, to a thriving multi- party democracy, the investment that the American people made in Taiwan has more than paid off. Today Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in a region of the world that still yearns for freedom. The good people of Taiwan have also been a part of American’s own success story, with many Taiwanese-Americans participating as leaders of business, and government, and leaders of their own community.
As we acknowledge the 35th anniversary of the TRA, let us come together to support and strengthen the US-Taiwan relationship. Our actions will directly impact the future of Taiwan and our strategic and economic standing in the critical Asia-Pacific region.
恩格爾 (紐約; 民主黨) (Mr. Engel) (6:30)
I am a big supporter of Taiwan, and have traveled there many times. The most recently being with [Royce] last year. I want to agree with everything you just said about Taiwan. Next month marks the 35 anniversary of the TRA, the Act passed in 1979 is the cornerstone of the relationship between our two nations. It’s been instrumental in maintaining peace and security across Taiwan Strait and in East Asia, and serves as official basis of friendship and cooperation between the US and Taiwan.
I am proud to be a lead sponsor with you, Mr. Chairman, on H.R.494, which we have affirmed the importance and relevance of TRA three decades after its adoption. Taiwan is a flourishing, multi-party democracy of over 23 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of US, along with bigger countries like Brazil and India.
Over the past 60 years, US-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes. Taiwan’s development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong US-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. Our relationship with Taiwan was initially defined by a shared strategic purpose of stopping the spread of communism in Asia. At the end of the Cold War, Taiwan’s political evolution from authoritarianism to one of the strongest democratic systems in Asia, has transformed the US-Taiwan relationship from one based solely on shared interest to one based on shared values.
One of the main obligations of the US under the TRA is to make available to Taiwan defensive arms so that Taiwan is able to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities. Despite the improvement on the political and economic ties between Taiwan and mainland China, Beijing’s military buildup opposite Taiwan is continuing and the balance of cross-strait military forces continue to shift toward China’s favor.
I encourage the Administration to work closely with the Congress in meeting our obligations under the TRA, and to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons it requires. In that light, I am very concerned about the decision of the US Air Force not to fund the so called CAPES program (Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite) in next year’s budget that would have upgraded the avionics system of the F16 fighter jets including of about 150 of Taiwan’s F16s. The Taiwan Defense Ministry now faces the tough decision of how to move forward about the upgrade of its fighters at a reasonable cost, an upgrade that it desperately needs.
我鼓勵美國政府與國會密切合作，以滿足台灣關係法的義務，且提供台灣需要的防禦性武器。鑑於這個情況，我對美國空軍不在明年的預算中 (所謂的短斗篷程序) 將已升級的F16戰鬥機，包括關於台灣150架的F16航電系統提供資金的這項決定甚為很擔心。台灣國防部現在面臨著艱難的決定—要如何進行它迫切的需要，以合理的成本，將其戰機的升級。
I hope our witness will be able to shed some light on this issue, and on our way forward for Taiwan and US. Taiwan’s political, economic and social transformation over the last 60 years has demonstrated that a state can be modern, democratic, and thoroughly Chinese. Taiwan’s example is an inspiration for other countries in Asia and throughout the world that linger under the control of one person or one party. The fact that Taiwan has now held five direct presidential elections is a clear sign of political maturity of the Taiwanese people and frankly a signal to Beijing that any change in relations between China and Taiwan cannot be imposed by the mainland.
For many years I have been a staunch supporter of the people of Taiwan and I will continue to lead efforts here in Congress to demonstrate continued US support for Taiwan. I think it is a moral obligation for the US to defend Taiwan and to be in support of and stand with Taiwan.
夏波 (俄亥; 共和黨) (Mr. Chabot) (10:50)
I was pleased to join you in traveling to Taiwan a couple of weeks ago, and I think we had a productive trip and certainly in meeting with several of the top officials, especially President Ma. I know my colleague and I were very happy with our warm reception and the many courtesies…
As one of the original founding co-chairs of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I am, of course, a strong supporter of a strong US-Taiwan alliance. Taiwan is a democracy, is a loyal friend and ally, and it deserves to be treated as such by the US Government. As we commemorate the 35th anniversary of TRA this year, it’s only appropriate that we strive to move even closer to the policy objectives set out in that landmark piece of legislation, chief among which, is the principle that our diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China is premised on the expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means.
For over 30 decades, the TRA has served as the cornerstone of the US-Taiwan relations. Along with President Reagan’s Six Assurances of 1979, the TRA has played an indispensible role in the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Asian Pacific region. Taiwan has come a long way since 1979. It has conducted direct presidential elections, something that would have been unthinkable back in 1979. These open and vigorously contested electoral campaigns testified the values of pluralism, transparency and the rule of law, shared by our two nations that deeply rooted in Taiwanese society.
At the same time, the threat of military aggression posed by the PRC to Taiwan has grown exponentially over the years. When I first came to the Congress back in 1995, China had a couple hundreds of missiles, and…there are now 1,600 short, mid-range ballistic missile [pointed at Taiwan]. …
謝爾曼 (加州; 民主黨) (Mr. Sherman) (13:07)
…I remember Mr. Chabot leading us in our effort to seek the release on humanitarian parole of the former president, Mr. Chen. I don’t think we can conclude one way or the other about the judicial determination there. But certainly given his poor health, given his service to the country, and given the unifying effect this would have, I’d hoped that we would continue to press for the humanitarian treatment and release of Mr. Chen. I think that it is important that we provide Taiwan for the tools to defend itself. But Taiwan needs to act as well; Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense; less than 1/5th per capita what we Americans do. And God blessed us with the Pacific Oceans separating us from China; Taiwan only has the Taiwan Straits. On a percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan only roughly spends half of what we do. So we should be willing to sell them the tools, and they should be willing to spend the money to buy these tools.
我記得夏波先生努力領導我們請求對前總統，陳先生的人道主義假釋釋放。我不認為我們可以能得出任何有關司法認定的結論。但由於他身體不好，又由於他執政時勞務全國各地，這一切共同的功效，我希望我們會繼續爭取對陳先生的人道待遇和釋放。[另一方面]，我認為，我們提供給台灣自衛的工具是很重要的事。但台灣自己也需要檢討: 台灣每年只動用約 $110億 美金在它的防禦；這是不到我們美國人人均的五分之一。上帝賜給我們太平洋在中國和我們的中間，而台灣只有台灣海峽。對國內生產總值百分比為基準，台灣所花的只有大約我們的一半。所以我們應該願意賣給他們這些工具，而他們應該願意花錢購買這些工具。
I am also concerned with the reduction in the reserve requirements imposed on the young people in Taiwan for military service. Finally, I disagree slightly with the Chairman—I do want to see Taiwan involved in the trade negotiations so long as America is out of those negotiations until those times when we revamp our own trade policy which has given the largest trade deficit in the history in the life of the planet.
莫伊 (國務院副助理國務卿負責東亞和太平洋事務) (Kin Moy) (15:52)
I am grateful to appear today to share news about the strength, substance and success of our unofficial US-Taiwan relationship. I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and strong interest in regional prosperity and stability. Your commitment was evidenced by the large Congressional delegation you led last month to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. As you noted earlier in your remarks, April 10th marks the 35thanniversary of the TRA. The resilience and development of our robust relationship with Taiwan in the last 35 years has been greatly fostered by the framework that the Congress has established in the TRA. The US-Taiwan relations are grouted in history and our shared values, and our common commitment to democracy and human rights. Maintaining and deepening a strong relationship with Taiwan is an important part of the US’s rebalance to the Asian-Pacific region.
Through the American Institute in Taiwan, we work closely with Taiwan authorities in a wide range of issues. In security, maintenance of peace across the Taiwan Strait is crucial to stability and prosperity throughout the Asian-Pacific region. The Obama Administration has notified Congress of over $12 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan. This is a tangible sign of the seriousness with which we regard Taiwan’s security. We encourage Taiwan to adopt an innovator or innovative approaches to maintain a credible self-defense capacity on an austere defense budget and in order to effectively deter coercion or aggression.
透過美國在台協會，當面臨各種各樣的問題時，我們都與台灣當局緊密合作。在安全性方面，維持海峽兩岸和平，使亞太地區穩定和繁榮是至關重要的。奧巴馬政府已通知國會，我們對台的軍售超過120億 ($12 billion) 美元。這是我們對台灣安全的嚴肅態度的明確信號。我們鼓勵台灣採取創新的方法，用一個簡樸的的國防預算，來保持可信的自我防禦能力，並有效的遏止脅迫或侵略。
In a region experiencing tension, US appreciates Taiwan’s cooperation to peacefully resolve disputes and share resources. In the area of economy and economic engagement, in 2013, Taiwan was the 16th largest export market for US goods, and the 8th largest export market for the US agricultural, fish, and forestry products. In 2012, direct investment from Taiwan to US stood at approximately at $7.9 billion. Our commercial relationship with the people of Taiwan is vibrant and continues to grow. Last year, we were pleased to hold two large delegations of Taiwan business leaders, first at the SelectUSA summit at the end of October, and then again in mid November during a visit of Taiwan’s CEOs, led by former Vice-President Vincent Siew. The Siew delegation brought over $2 billion in new or ongoing Taiwan manufacturing investments in the US.
在這一個緊張的區域，美國讚賞台灣的合作，以和平方式解決爭端，並共享資源。2013年，在經濟和經濟參與方面，台灣是全球第16大美國商品出口市場和第8大美國農業，漁業和林業產品的出口市場。 2012年，來自台灣，直接到美國的投資約為79億 ($7.9 billion) 美元。我們與台灣人的商業關係是充滿活力，也持續增長。去年，我們兩次很高興舉辦的台灣商業領袖大型代表團，首先十月底舉行<選擇美國>的高峰會議，然後又在11月中, 由前副總統文森特蕭(蕭萬長)帶領的台灣的董事長團，來美訪問。這蕭代表團帶來了超過20億 ($2 billion) 美元 新的或正在進行的投資。
In March, 2013, we restarted our engagement with Taiwan under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, otherwise known as TIFA after a six year hiatus. We have taken note of Taiwan’s intention of formulating a new economic reform, demonstrated its willingness and capabilities in joining in regional economic integration initiatives. The US will continue to encourage Taiwan, to further liberalize its trade and investment measures.
International Space for Taiwan (19:10)
And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the area of concern, also, to us is Taiwan’s international space. As a top 20 world economy and a full member of WTO and APEC, Taiwan plays a constructive role in the Asian Pacific region and worldwide. Taiwan participates in about 60 international organizations, as well as hundreds of international non-government organizations. US supports Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood for membership, and we support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in other international organizations.
We are pleased that since 2009, Taiwan has participated, every year, in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer. We welcome Taiwan’s participation at the International Civil Aviation Organization assembly in Montreal in 2013 as Guest of the ICAO council president. We support Taiwan’s expanded participation in the future. We also encourage the UN, UN system agencies and other international organizations to increase Taiwan participation in technical or expert meetings.
Taiwan’s role as a responsible player in the global community has been well demonstrated by its disaster relief efforts in the region. Taiwan was a quick and generous donor of supplies and funding after the 2011 triple disaster in Japan, and after last November’s Typhoon Haiyan of the Philippines. In short, Taiwan [is] a stable and capable friend in the region, contributing to peace and security. Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to appear today to highlight the strength and durability of ties between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and to underscore substance of the successes of our cooperative efforts within the context of unofficial relations. Taiwan has earned a respected place in the world. Every society wishes dignity for itself, and people on Taiwan are no exception. Thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act, people of goodwill in the United States and on Taiwan have a firm foundation to further strengthen our robust relationship (for the benefit of both our peoples).
作為一個負責任的團員，台灣在國際社會的角色，已經通過它在該地區的救災工作充分證明。台灣在2011年當日本的三合一災難 [地震、海嘯、核電意外] 以及去年十一月菲律賓的颱風海燕發生後，是物資和資金的快速和慷慨的捐助者。總之，台灣[是我們]在該地區穩定和具有能力來促進和平與安全的朋友。最後，主席先生和委員會的成員，我再次感謝你們讓我今天有機會出席，來強調美國人民與台灣人民之間關係的強度和耐久性，以及我們因非官方關係架構內開展合作的成功結果，台灣贏得了在世界上受尊敬的地位。每個社會都希望有本身的尊嚴，而台灣的人民也不例外。由於台灣關係法，在美國與台灣的善意人士能有堅實的基礎，進一步加強我們強大的關係。
Questions and Answer Session
羅伊斯 (加州，主席; 共和黨 ) (Mr. Royce)
There is one thing that is disappointing to me. I often speak on the phone to the Assistant Director Danny Russell, and I believe that he intended to be here to testify...But time after time, and this is something that the Subcommittee of the Asian-Pacific [Region] has talked to me about, for whatever reason, the Administration pulls the witnesses. And I know it is not the lack of engagement on the part of Danny Russell. We’ve talked to him repeatedly about the issues. There is something about the relationship here with the State Department, when Eliot Engel and I make these request, or when Subcommittee Chairman Chabot on the Asian Pacific Subcommittee with Mr. Faleomavaega [make the request], for some reason, the witnesses are always canceled.
What we want to talk about is Asian policies. As far as I know, Danny Russell and I are in concurrence on a lot of these issues. But I don’t know about further up in the Administration. So when I ask questions, for some reason, the State Department // I am going to ask you a question now, for example, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I strongly believe that Taiwan should be included in the Trans Pacific Partnership. Does the US Government support Taiwan’s inclusion in the TPP? That’s my question to you. Can you speak on behalf of the Administration here?
Thank you very much. I do appreciate your comments and I did have a chance to speak to Danny Russell before coming up, and he wanted me to pass on his regrets and appreciation for setting up this meeting. I can say that, from our part, I don’t think that there’s anything preventing us from talking about Taiwan issues here.
It’s not just Taiwan. If Subcommittee Chairman Chabot was not equally concerned and disappointed about it, has he not brought it up with the Secretary of State here yesterday, I probably would not have brought it up. But it’s just a pattern that, at this point, to us, the Asian Pacific region is vitally important. We spend a lot of time on this issue, and we want the Administration to be equally engaged on this. (So if you will carry that information back.) But again, particularly given Taiwan’s almost singular reliance on cross strait trade, does the US government support the inclusion of Taiwan in the TPP?
I will relay your concerns to my colleagues. It certainly isn’t a statement about our commitment to a strong US-Taiwan unofficial relations. In fact, I think we have a very strong record, and I think we have a very good story to tell about that. With regard to your question about TPP, we welcome Taiwan’s interest in it. We’ve heard from them very recently about their interest. We also welcome (and I think that you met with President Ma Ing-Jeou on your recent Congressional Delegation) [President Ma’s] steps to liberalize Taiwan’s economy.
As you know, we are in ongoing negotiations on TPP, and I think what I can say about this is that perhaps it is best if we move towards conclusions on those negotiations before we discuss additional membership. But I think that we are taking a step by step approach here. We have heard from Taiwan as well as others about interests in TPP, and we certainly welcome that interest and we are definitely willing to consider, along with some countries that approach us most recently. We are willing to discuss about TPP in the future.
One of the most important aspects of the TPP beyond the important trade-related benefits, is that the grouping will help shape East Asia’s multi-lateral political architecture by firmly anchoring nation states in a binding, legal agreement. I want to make certain that Taiwan is part of that agreement. I think it’s critical to Taiwan that it be included not only because it’s in one of the world’s top 20 economies, but also because it is in our own strategic interest, and adding Taiwan to TPP will allow it a greater access to other trade agreements with Europe, for example. It’s going to serve as a strong symbol of American support, and that is why I strongly support this.
There is another issue that I want to talk about, and that is the issue about the F16 upgrades. Does the US remain fully committed to Taiwan’s F16 upgrade program?
Back to TPP. What we would encourage Taiwan to do, as you know, TPP is a consensus , tight membership. We would encourage Taiwan to raise its interest in membership with all of the other parties as well. I know that Congressman Engel also raised his concerns about the issue of the CAPE’s program. As I understand, the US Air Force’s funding for the CAPE’s program will continue through 2014. The US Air Force F-16 program office has determined the lack of US Air Force participation beyond the fiscal year 2014 will not have a significant impact on the Taiwan program. And that all funding can be covered in Taiwan’s current letter of offer and acceptance. As a result, potential cuts in the US Air Force’s funding program in the CAPE’s program will not negatively impact Taiwan’s F16 retrofit program.
We certainly are committed to the F16 retrofit program. I think that we have demonstrated that and we certainly had discussions with Taiwan.
It’s discouraging to me and others because many of us here, including myself, wrote you and talked to the Administration about the sale of new F16s. So now we are talking about retrofit. We want to make certain that this goes forward. I would suggest the sale of the new F16s would be an easy solution to this. I strongly support this.
The Taiwan Defense Ministry now faces a tough decision on how to move forward with the upgrade of its F16 fighters at a reasonable cost. This is an upgrade that it desperately needs. Maybe they will continue it, maybe they won’t. I am concerned about Taiwan being able to maintain their fleet of F16s, and certainly, the decision that the USAF made not to fund the CAPES program was a poor decision—it just makes no sense to me whatsoever. When it comes to Taiwan, there is a sort of undercurrent that we feel over time. We bend over backwards to try not to upset the sensitivity of the Beijing regime. And frankly it irks me.
Not that I don’t wish to have good relations with Beijing—we should—but not at the expense of our relations with Taiwan, or not at the expense of our friendship with Taiwan. So it really irritates me that we make a decision that has an adverse impact on our friend Taiwan. Doesn’t seem to be for any good policy purpose other than to placate Beijing.
…I regret that I am not able to speak for my colleagues in the Air Force. I do understand your concerns, and I will relay those to my colleagues. But what I do want to do is to strongly emphasize that our improvement in the bilateral relations with the PRC does not come at the expense of our relationship with Taiwan. In fact, I think that our relationship with Taiwan, right now, is as strong as it ever has been. We have often times emphasized that point, that we have an interest in strengthening relations with Beijing, but absolutely not at the expense of our very strong relationship with Taiwan and the people on Taiwan.
I certainly hope that continues to be the case, because sometimes it appears that it’s not really the case. I’ll take your word, but want you to duly note that we here at this committee feel strongly about this. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that Taiwan is accorded in an appropriate level of participation in the international organizations such as the WHO and ICAO? (32:59)
…As I said in my introductory remarks, it’s an area of primary importance to us; it is a priority that the expertise from Taiwan is recognized. There is so much professional expertise there, so much knowledge in Taiwan that it deserves to be recognized in the international organizations. This is not just a matter of knowledge, however; it is a matter of dignity too. And we take it very seriously. So we do review different opportunities to expand. You have noted ICAO and working together with a number of other countries. We have supported not just Taiwan’s guest participation as it appears as a guest last year at the Assembly, but more frequent interaction with ICAO, because there is a lot of technical expertise they can bring to those types of meetings. (34:18)
But as you noted, the World Health Assembly, we also look at opportunities working on climate change issues, various types of international organizations we often consult because there are often times when there are issues where Taiwan has a unique ability to revive (34:32) knowledge, recommendations, imaginative ideas beyond just their technical expertise, and we want to take advantage of that and we want to continue to do that. (34:52)
Is the Administration providing Taiwan the defensive weapons that it requires as required by the TRA, are there defensive systems that Taiwan has requested but we have decided not to provide, and if so, what are they? (35:14)
I am not aware of such systems. But we are in compliance with the TRA in making available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities. We will continue to be in compliance with that. The US Government often review their defense capabilities, and I think we have a very strong record in this Administration of providing that.
萊赫蒂寧 (佛羅里達州; 原董事長; Ms. Ros-Lehtinen)(36:11)
Relations between the US and Taiwan are at a critical juncture. I am concerned, as all of us are, that China’s continued rise in aggression in the East and South China Seas, and the feeble response by our State Department to North Korea’s missile launches, which are clear violation of international sanctions. The people of Taiwan have every reason to fear developments of the West Pacific to worry about the future of their land and to question, both the resolve and the commitment of the US. (How tragic). And as we approach the 35th anniversary of this very important and essential TRA anniversary, we remember that this crucial legislation forms the cornerstone of US-Taiwan relations. It is the foundation of policy that has been and will be, and will remain forevermore the anchor of peace and security of the West Pacific.
But as we reflect on the promise of the TRA on this 35th anniversary, we must also gage the fulfillment of its specific policies, and we examine the lack of strategic vision in this part of the world and we talk about where we go from here, when we, over here, watch China, again, increases its defense budget by double digits, begin construction on a second aircraft carrier, establish air defense identification zone in the East China Sea and continue its aggression over the Senkaku Island. There is no better time to reaffirm, to clarify, and to strengthen the relations with our democratic ally and our strongest friend, Taiwan. But instead of recommitting to Taiwan, we continue to hear our State Department speak in half-truths, invent a laundry list of items that hinders our relations with Taiwan and our Pacific allies, and do everything it can to not provoke China.
And that sadly seems to be our policy with Taiwan: don’t antagonize China. Taiwan Policy Act introduced by my colleagues and Chairs of the Taiwan Caucus and me, passed down to this committee last August, the bill aims to rectify these problems by advancing the sale of essential defense articles and the new sale of F16s is included in this bill. It encourages high level of visits between the US and Taiwan officials; it promotes bilateral trade agreements. What is the Administration’s policy on the TPA, and secondly, how does the Administration plan to counterbalance China’s power, when we don’t even commit to our democratic ally, Taiwan, and by extension, any of our regional allies, and thirdly, what is the Administration going to do to develop Taiwan’s economic bonds with the US—its independence, its strengthen our economic bonds. What is the State Department, the Obama Administration’s policy on Taiwan—other than don’t make China mad?
I don’t think that our Taiwan policy is founded on the principle of “let’s not make China mad”. In fact, I think that if you look at the record, we have done an enormous amount to expand our relationships to strengthen it, in all areas, not just the security aspects of it; the economics’ side. It’s also the people to people side as well. As you may know, with the help of the others, we granted Taiwan…(interrupted by Ros-Lehtinen)
我不認為我們對台政策是建立在“我們不要讓中國生氣”的原則。事實上，我認為，如果你看我們的記錄，我們在所有領域裡已經做了許多可以以擴大及加強我們的關係—不只是安全性方面的問題；經濟、人民對人民方面也一樣。正如你可能知道的，與其他人的幫助下，我們給予台灣...（由羅斯 - 萊赫蒂寧打斷）
Have you read the Taiwan Policy Act we have filed? If not, I would like to give that to you and have an Administration policy on it. How are we counterbalancing China’s power and committing to Taiwan?
I think that, of course I am very pleased to take a look with my colleagues at the legislation, but I think we have a very strong record of support for Taiwan through our unofficial relations in accordance with the TRA. As I noted, the 35th anniversary is a reason to celebrate; it’s a reason also to commemorate just how we’ve come what we need to do in the future we can still refine and enhance…(interrupted by Ros-Lehtinen)
我認為，當然我很高興與我立法的同事看看，但我認為，透過非官方關係，根據台灣關係法，我們對台灣的支持有非常好的紀錄。正如我提到的，35週年是值得慶祝的理由。另一個原因，是為了紀念我們所經過的，我們將來需要做的，還可以完善和加強......（由羅斯 - 萊赫蒂寧打斷）
I don’t believe that the people of Taiwan share those sentiments. I don’t think they see us as upholding the principles enshrined in the cornerstone of our US’s foreign policy related to Taiwan, which is the TRA. It promises a lot, and I think the people of Taiwan would think that we haven’t fulfilled those missions. Do you think that we have?
I do believe—I mean, I haven’t seen any recent polls—but I would imagine that the people on Taiwan regard the US relationship as, if not the most important relationship for Taiwan, it is got to be right up there. They are good friends of ours; they think like we do. Their values we share, I would think that they are very supportive of the things that we have done.
Do you think that we need to do more? 你認為我們需要做的更多嗎？
We are always looking for ways to strengthen the relations, just as we are looking in the larger context in our rebalanced Asia. We want to strengthen our relationships with our allies; we want to strengthen our relationships with...
New sales of F16s and higher technologies of planes for the needs of Taiwan?
Again, we have had a very strong record of providing defense articles to Taiwan. 再次，我們有非常好的紀錄提供防衛武器給台灣。
One issue we brought up with President Ma was the incarceration of the former President Chen. One of the red flags of a democracy that it isn’t working real well is that the former president is in jail. That is true in just about any country. What are we doing to seek either the humane treatment or the humanitarian parole for the former President Chen?
As you know, the former president was convicted on corruption charges after his 2008 presidency, including the transfer of presidential office funds to private Swiss bank accounts. We believe that his conviction was in a system that is fair, impartial and transparent. Rule of law exists in Taiwan. In regard to your specific question, certainly we have heard varying accounts of the status of his health, and certainly we would want Taiwan to review his health condition. I am not aware of any or I don’t have an update …
Let me go on to the next question. Taiwan is spending only half as much of GDP on defense as we are, I don’t mind going to my district and say, Let’s pay taxes, but Taiwan is on the front lines. I am sure you’ve had discussions when they say they can’t afford to spend anymore. We are all very concerned about the maintenance of their F16 aircrafts. The US taxpayers may not be able to pay for that. Taiwan has only a 5% value added tax. Has the US pushed Taiwan not just to spend more on its defense, but if they say they don’t have the money to make its value added tax or other taxes at the rate of our European allies who we also push to pay for their own defense?
On the issue of spending more, we have encouraged Taiwan to fulfill what it has said in the past that it will spend up to 3% of their GDP on defense.
Why do we accept 3% for them and including veteran benefits, 5% for us?
This is what President Ma has stated in the past, and so we do hope that [interrupted]
I think the best way to get the 3% is to start demanding 6%, or insisting that a good ally that seeks our support for a country that faces possible eradication or forced incorporation ought to be doing well more than the US per capita, and I think if we start to talk about the 6% then we may someday see 3 or 4% at the minimum. Finally, what are we doing to push Taiwan to adopt better laws against the peer to peer websites for piracy movies?
I think that this is part of our economic engagement with Taiwan. What we’ve had said in the past, and this is in terms of all our dialogues, we would like to have a little bit more confidence, especially in areas such as intellectual property protection…[interrupted]
But are we specifically focusing on peer-to-peer websites, the lack of legislation in that area, and the pirating of our movies?
I am not aware of…(both speaking at once)…Intellectual property protection definitely is a priority of ours…
A general statement about intellectual property protection won’t have the specific effect or may have no effect, compared to the specificity, and I hope that you will specifically focus their attention on the peer-to-peer website piracy of our movies. Finally, what steps is the Administration taking to make sure that Taiwan has appropriate participation in international organizations, such as WHO, ICAO, and the climate control (UNFCCC—UN Framework Convention on Climate Change)?
As I noted earlier, international space is a priority of ours, and we are looking for opportunities for Taiwan experts and professionals to shine in their fields in international flora. We will continue to do that. That really does help those organizations; it really helps the global community when they participate.
史密斯 (新澤西; 共和黨) (Mr. Smith) (49:04)
Over the past few years and across two different administrations, we have witnessed an alarming number of gushing statements by senior American officials on the US’s One-China Policy. Last year, PLA (People’s Liberation Army)’s General Chen Bingde, during a visit to Washington, claimed that the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US policy maintains that “there is only one China in the world”, and that “Taiwan is part of China.” Not long after that, Admiral Mullen shared the view that “peaceful unification of China”.
Let me ask you, the People’s Republic of China, as we all know, is a dictatorship; it is a gulag state and would we have wished that reunification of West Germany into East Germany when Honecker was ruling as a cruel dictator in East Germany? I think not. So I think those kinds of statements are not helpful. I do believe, and I want to ask your view on this, as to whether the time has come for the Cold War relic, and I know all about the Shanghai Communiqué, I’ve read it, and I’ve actually had an argument with Li Peng in China, when we brought up the human rights [issues], and he said that the Shanghai Communiqué said nothing about the human rights at all. That was true, but he used it as a dodge and as a way of precluding any discussion on human rights. But shouldn’t we have a One-China, One-Taiwan policy?
And secondly, if you could, the Taiwan Relations Act Section 2 points out that the “enactment of this Act is necessary to help maintain the peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific”. What are the consequences of the US if Taiwan were to come under PRC control, and do we fully realize that such a shift would have devastating implications for US’s long standing security partners and allies of East Asia including Japan and South Korea?
What I’d like to point to is most recently, as you may probably have seen in the press that there has been more dialogue between the two sides of the Strait recently, the head of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan Wang Yu-Chi with Zhang Zhe-Jun, head of the Taiwan Office. We have gone on record as saying that we support that kind of warming of ties. And I think that one of the reasons why there has been such discussions is that we have been so supportive of Taiwan, giving them the confidence, so they can have this kinds of dialogue. So I think we do have a very strong record of that. We do support the increased dialogue between the two sides. In terms of consequences, I wouldn’t want to get into any sort of hypothetical scenarios here. I don’t think that that is something that we view as very likely right now.
What happens? We do have scenarios that we consider at the Pentagon and at the State.
It’s not something that is sort of a normal feature of our discussions, these types of hypotheticals. What I can say is that I heard your remarks about the One-China Policy. But this is a policy that has endured through many administrations and…I think that what we have done, and much of this has to do with the TRA but it has given Taiwan a great deal of confidence over the last years to increase the kind of intensity of discussions with the PRC, knowing that the US is always in support is greatly comforting to the Taiwan side.
But frankly, some of our diplomats including our former Ambassador Bellocchi has suggested that the ambiguity and the statements that may have made could send the wrong signal to the PRC, particularly as they build up militarily in and around or in proximity to Taiwan. And with the saber rattling we see occurring in the South China Sea and an ever expansive foreign policy, the ugliness towards Japan coming out of Beijing, the useful diplomatic affection, perhaps it was useful for a while, seems to me that it could inadvertently lead to miscalculations by Beijing about what happens if they take Taiwan.
I don’t think that Beijing questions US resolve on the Taiwan issue. We continue to be extremely supportive and we continue to expand our unofficial relations and that I think does a great deal to help strengthen and to allow for a more peaceful and stable environment across the Strait.
洛文塔爾 (加州; 民主黨) (Mr. Lowenthal) (55:05)
I have a one statement before I ask any questions that echoes the Chair’s comments. I recently visited Taiwan and met with many government officials, and I found it very very educational and I too believe very strongly that the State Department and the Government should understand the importance of Taiwan being a part of the TPP. And I think that should be a message back. So before I ask a question, many of us think strongly believe that we should do whatever we can to encourage that kind of development.
When I was there, I was very impressed with the cross strait dialogue that was going on between Taiwan and the PRC. I would like to know what is our State Department’s involvement in that dialogue between Taiwan [and China]. How can we be helpful in promoting engagement between China and Taiwan? It seems to me that President Ma was very proud of the agreements that already had been made, especially the trade agreement, the increased tourism that was going on, the increased flights that were going on between. What are our involvement in that has been? The second question is, what is your perspective on the current and forthcoming political situation in Taiwan, including the 2016 presidential election in which President Ma will be turned down. How will that affect the cross-strait relationships; will that be one of the defining characteristics in terms of that election?
In terms of cross strait dialogue, we don’t play a direct role. They’ve had direct talks. In fact, the dialogue that I was referring to between Wang Yu-Chi and Zhang Zhe Zhen, was really the first time in 60 years of such a discussion…What we have done is we have given Taiwan a great deal of confidence, through our policies and through our direct assistance and that has enabled them to have more engagement across the strait. We believe that more engagements, especially if it’s at a pace that is consistent with the aspirations of the people on Taiwan, for people of both sides of the Strait, we would very much support that, because we believe that creates a more stable and peaceful environment, but it does have to come at a pace that the people on Taiwan feel comfortable with.
In terms of the upcoming election, we don’t speculate on how that’s going to affect cross strait relations but it’s a good time to highlight how we have been and still are on the thriving democracy that exists in Taiwan. It is really remarkable. Just personally…the first time I went to Taiwan was in 1978. You just cannot imagine the change that’s taking place there. Mr. Chairman, when you go to Taiwan, it just highlights the kind of values that they share with us. You know very well that it is this kind of energetic kind of democracy that exists there and so I won’t speculate; we don’t get involved in their domestic policies and how that is going to play out in terms of the cross-strait policy in the future. But it is really a good time to celebrate; it is a remarkable story in Asia—the democracy that exists in Taiwan.
夏波 (俄亥; 共和黨) (Mr. Chabot) 59:30
I would like to personally thank Mr. Sherman for raising the issue of President Chen, which he did strongly when we were on the Co Del (Congressional Delegation) recently in Taiwan. Prior to that trip, I’ve been there about a year ago, with another of my Democratic colleagues, the ranking member of the Asia Pacific Committee, Eni Faleomavaega. And on that particular Co Del, Eni and I went down to the prison where President Chen is being held. He has been there going on five years now. You are correct, there is conviction for corruption charges. We understand that completely. There’s a whole lot of aspects of that which we can discuss in great detail. For example, there is an argument that there was a judge that was more favorable to him that was replaced by a judge who was less favorable. There are all kinds of stories that you hear; I don’t want to go to all the details about that.
But the fact is that he has been in prison now for going on five years. I’ve read the medical reports; I’ve talked to the doctors who have examined him. I have seen him with my own eyes. I have met with him many times when he was the President of Taiwan. He is the second democratically elected president, served for eight years. And I think Mr. Sherman is absolutely right when he says that there is something wrong when one administration comes in, and the previous administration is in prison. Something is not right. I’ve seen, again, with my own eyes. The man has Parkinson’s; he shakes constantly; he’s got cardiovascular problems, depression, a whole range of things. We’ve talked to President Ma and others about it, and I believe that medical parole, as Mr. Sherman mentioned, is a logical Chen medical parole. We are not saying that he’d be free, but at least he can go home to his family for whatever years that he has left.
As I noted earlier, we have the confidence in the fairness and the impartiality and transparency in Taiwan’s judicial system. And we have made clear to Taiwan our expectation that procedures governing the terms of Chen Shui-Bian’s imprisonment and access to health care will be transparent, fair, and impartial, and so if there are occasions, and this is just a general statement from the US Government, when there are cases, when there are such health concerns, we would…make note of that to, in this case, the Taiwan Authorities, but other governments as well, when there may be some humanitarian considerations that could be made. But certainly, we believe that the original case was tried [interrupted]
I am not talking about the original case; I am talking about NOW. Still that was an excellent answer. But my question is, does the Administration have a position on medical parole? Well, is there a position? You said he ought to be treated humanely in prison; we are saying that he shouldn’t be in prison at this point in time. He has been in prison; he is there now. We are saying that medical parole should be granted…Do you have a position on that? Should he be granted? If you don’t have one, that’s okay. But I just would like to know.
I don’t think we take the position [interrupted]
Okay. All right. Thank you. That was my question. I will ask you another position if you have this. The President, the Vice President, the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister [of Taiwan] can’t come to Washington, D.C. We want to meet with them, we have to go to San Francisco, or Baltimore, or [somewhere]; they are not allowed to come to the capital of the United States, which I think is a travesty for a close ally of the US. We have introduced legislatures innumerable times to dump that policy, which I think is unfair to Taiwan. Does the Administration have a position on that?
We continue to have our One-China Policy that is set forth in the Three Joint Communiqués…[interrupted]
I am aware of that. Do you have a position on whether they should come here?
In terms of the travel of Taiwan Authorities that is consistent with those policies—our One-China Policy … [interrupted]
So you believe we should continue the President, the Vice-President, the Foreign Minister—so they should not be able to come to Washington, D.C.?
I think our policy has been very consistent over a number of administrations [interrupted by “I am asking for an answer of yes or no”] and I believe that we will continue.
So you are saying that they are not to be allowed to come here; continue with that policy. We are saying that we should change that policy. You say stick with it.
I say that our policy has been consistent and I believe we will be consistent in the future.
康諾利 (維吉尼亞州; 民主黨) (Mr. Connolly) (1:06:12)
Briefly, what, in your opinion, or the Administration’s opinion, does the TRA commit United States to do with respect to the military relationships with Taiwan?
As noted earlier, we are obligated to make available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services that are necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. It is an obligation that we don’t shirk these obligations. The needs of Taiwan are under constant review.
Good. I would agree with you. Would you also agree that something Beijing doesn’t understand is that big stick of Teddy Roosevelt. We can talk softly, but they got to also know that we also carry a big stick, and that we mean it, that we keep our commitments, and that whatever happens, ultimately, in the Taiwan Strait will happen peacefully. It is not going to happen by military force, and the US is prepared to make sure that it doesn’t happen by military force. You think, especially in light of Chinese behavior, in the [Senkaku?] Islands throughout the Pacific Rim that that message is maybe more important than ever from the US with respect to Taiwan?
As I noted earlier, I don’t think that the PRC doubts our resolve, our continued positive presence in the East Asia Pacific region [interrupted by “Really? With respect to Taiwan?”] Absolutely.
正如我前面提到的，我不認為中國會懷疑我們的決心，我們在東亞太平洋地區繼續存在正[被對方打斷: “真的？有關台灣的決心呢?”] 當然可以。
United States, in 2001, tentatively agreed to sell diesel submarines to Taiwan. Thirteen years later, where are we in the submarine sale?
As you know, we continue to review the defense needs and we make decisions that are appropriate [interrupted]
Have we sold a single one of those diesel submarines to Taiwan13 years later?
I am not aware of that, sir.
Did, by any chance, Beijing object to that sale?
We don’t discuss arms sales of defense…
Did they express themselves either publicly or through private channels that you are aware of?
I am not aware of…
So why the hang up? Why not sell the diesels then?
Again, we make decisions not with the PRC in mind. We make those decisions based on what we feel are our needs.
Oh. So the decision tentatively to sell submarines to Taiwan in 2001 is still under consideration as to whether it meets your definition of our appropriate defense for Taiwan.
There are a range of systems, there are a range of different packages that we constantly…[interrupted]
What about F16s? The Congress has repeatedly said the sale of F16s makes sense to us. Is that all under review for whether it is appropriate part for the defense of Taiwan?
We’ve made the determination that the F16 retrofit…was the most appropriate type of weapon systems to sell to Taiwan and we continue to believe that that is the case.
What about the military exercises? Any considerations to include Taiwan, for example, in RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise)?
We always consider, and this is our policy worldwide, we are always considering different participants. I am not aware of such consideration, but I think my colleagues in the Defense Department can better address that.
We don’t want to ever be provocative, but we need to stand by our alliances. We want a good, productive relationship, it seems to me, with the PRC, but I also know from history, that Beijing respects strength, peace through strength, and our commitment to Taiwan is an extraordinary test case, and it seems to me that we have to follow through on our commitments with respect to Taiwan. Beijing doesn’t have to like it, but it will have to respect it.
韋伯 (德州; 共和黨) (Mr. Weber) 1:11:10
You said earlier that when you make decisions, that y’all don’t consider Beijing; you just reaffirmed that with my colleague Mr. Connolly. I think Chris Smith raised the issue of the One-China Policy. Does it not bother you that that exists? That there are statements that people have made--high level officials--have made that agree on the One-China Policy? Does the Administration not view that as a problem?
Our One-China Policy is one that existed for several decades now…several administrations…
I’ll take that as a no. So you haven’t sold submarines yet; you don’t take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree that y’all would be okay with a One-Russia Policy when it comes to Crimea in the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology?
I can’t speak to those issues. But again, we are obligate d to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan. We have been through several administrations, I think, vigilant in terms of providing them…
But in view of recent events, wouldn’t you agree that the Administration ought to be thinking about revamping its policy, that perhaps we would want to get in gear…[it has been] 13 years [since the talk about the sale of submarines]…has the world changed in 13 years?
In what sense, sir? 在哪一方面，先生？
How about in your view of the imminent danger of perhaps mainland China…trying to take back over Taiwan. We’ve said that they are our close friend and ally. The fact that their officials cannot come to Washington D.C. is a problem. Events around the world should indicate that now more than ever we need a stronger relationship with Taiwan. Does the Administration understand the seriousness? Especially under the recent event of Russia, Ukraine, Crimea…Things aren’t getting any better, so is there a possibility y’all might step up the program to sell those defense weapons to Taiwan? Maybe before the next 13 years?
As I noted, they are under constant review. I take your point about the world changing to adjust to those changes. Remarkably, as I noted earlier, there is more dialogue between Taipei and Beijing than there ever has been before.
So there is going to be some exercises over Hawaii. Beijing was invited; Taiwan was not. Why?
I think that our policy, in terms of strengthening military-military relations with Beijing, are fairly apparent. I can defer to my colleagues in the Defense Department to comment on the status of those relations. But as part of our rebalance, our consideration of making of strengthening the stability and peace in East Asia, I think this is a good idea.
Okay, obviously, because they weren’t invited. Does this not strike you as odd that China isn’t as concerned about what we are doing as it seems, words and actions have consequences. Witness Russia, the recent invasion of Crimea of Ukraine, so to speak. Does it not strike you as odd that we seem a lot more worried about Beijing than they are of us? Do y’all take that into account?
I don’t think that we balance our concerns …we don’t think about it…[interrupted by “well, that’s obvious”.] But, what I can tell you is that I think it’s a very smart thing to expand our relations with all countries in the East Asia and I don’t think that any of this comes at the expense of Taiwan, and I think that our relationships with Taiwan have been extremely strong; we will continue to strengthen those relations.
佩里 (賓夕法尼亞; 共和黨) (Mr. Perry) (1:16:56)
I feel like I can’t get a whole lot of straight answers, so I’d like to go to some kind of yes and no format if I could because it seems to be a lot of time to just discussing about the fact that the Administration is interested in talking about or is considering or whatever. Regarding the PLA force build up. The US analysts assessed that the primary driver of PLA’s force build up is preparation for conflict over Taiwan status, including contingencies or possible US intervention. So that’s US analysts. The question is, is this still the assessment of the Executive Branch? Briefly.
I am not a spokesperson for our colleagues in the Defense.
But I am talking about the Executive Branch. Is this their assessment? Just a yes or no or I don’t know.
Of course we will stand by the assessments that have been made.
So, the answer is essentially “yes”?
We stand by the reports that we do.
Do you know if Taiwan shares the same assessment?
Taiwan has taken many precautions in its defense posture—it’s best to ask them that question, but, certainly, there have been discussions that goes on about this sort of thing. I would imagine that [interrupted]
You don’t really know. 你也不知道。
I can’t speak for Taiwan. 我不能為台灣說話。
I understand. But in the discussions that the Administration’s had, if that’s how they are posturing their forces and their strategy based on their assessment. You don’t know.
Is your question whether Taiwan believes it or whether… [interrupted]
Yes. Do they share the US’s assessment, if that’s the reason for the build up.
I think you would have to ask the Administration.
Regarding Taiwan’s membership in the TPP. The Administration’s position: for or against? It’s important for us to know.
We welcome their interest. I don’t think the conversations have gone so far as to be pro or con—we are a long way away from that. But we welcome their interest.
I am sure that we do. But you are saying that the Administration hasn’t decided yet. You are happy for the interest, but you don’t know.
The issue hasn’t come up to that point yet.
The issue hasn’t been brought up or it isn’t to a point where you can decide yes or no?
It hasn’t come up to the point. We know that Taiwan has expressed some interest, and we are welcoming that interest. But we are long way away from discussing that. We have other discussions that we are having on Taiwan’s economic policies and we are certainly engaged in those, and we are warming our economic and trade relations with Taiwan.
Regarding the PRC’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). What have been concerns in Taiwan’s response to the PRC’s ADIZ announced in November of 2013?
What do you mean by concern? 你是說什麼顧慮？
The Administration’s concern. Do you have any or are you in agreement?
I think what’s important here is that President Ma has gone on record as expressing concern. What he has said in public and what is encouraging is that he wants a peaceful, stable environment in the region that if there are disagreements, they should be resolved through dialogue.
Do you know what the response would be if there were an air force or navy intercept in the ADIZ? If the PLA had intercepted a Taiwanese aircraft or marine vessels in that area, and there were some incursion, what would some of our responses be?
I am not going to get into the speculation or hypothetical situations, but we have gone on record in response to the announcement of this ADIZ as not accepting it. So, again, I don’t want to speculate on any kind of possible [interrupted]
閉幕詞Closing Statement: 羅伊斯
As you can see there is tremendous bipartisan support for Taiwan and it is my sincere hope that the Administration would take a more proactive stance on Taiwan, including working with Taiwan so that it can join the TPP. The Asia Pacific region is going to witness a significant growth in economics and prosperity in the next 10 years, and positioning the US, we are, after all, all on the Pacific Rim, with this opportunity is a task that we take very seriously on this committee. And as the Chairman of this committee, I’ve made the Asia-Pacific region a top priority, so I look forward to work closely with the Administration on this and other issues.